Discussion Paper: The Case for Separation of Powers in Water Regulation
Prepared independently by Martin Hurst for Sustainability First (SF), with support from SF colleagues and peer review from experts in regulation in various sectors.
Executive Summary
This paper starts from the premise that water regulation should deliver outcomes that secure long-term resilience, improve the water environment, protect drinking water quality, ensure bills offer value for money, provide good service for consumers (including those in vulnerable circumstances), and, as the government has made clear, support economic growth. Against that wider backdrop, it focuses on one specific issue: how regulation should be exercised across this broad range of duties and powers. The author has considerable respect for much that Ofwat does – and while agreeing that a high-level totemic change was required, feels that the political rhetoric around Ofwat probably arises as much from wider frustrations with the sector as the reality of its past performance as an economic regulator.
The new Water Regulator will have a tough job. Alongside its core role of delivering outcomes that matter directly to households, communities, and the wider economy, it must restore trust and build its reputation for fair and impartial regulation.
These outcomes do not only matter as regulatory objectives, but because they impact lives and long-term confidence in the sector. Households need fair, affordable, predictable bills and confidence that regulatory decisions prevent poor behaviour; communities need resilient water systems that respect environmental limits; and investors need regulatory clarity that supports sustained, long-term investment and fair returns. To achieve this, investors need confidence and a reasonable degree of certainty. Effective regulation must therefore balance social needs and expectations and environmental integrity with economic discipline and the need to retain an investible proposition. Getting the institutional design right is not an abstract governance concern, particularly for an essential service such as water, it is a practical safeguard to ensure that regulatory decisions command public legitimacy, meet public need, enable ambitious environmental delivery, and support stable, long-term financing of essential infrastructure.
To do this Ofwat already has (and the new regulator will have even more so) a broad range of instruments at its disposal. For example: the classic tools of economic and environmental regulation, investigative powers, the new concepts of supervisory regulation (building on existing prudential regulation) and constrained discretion, and a formidable array of penalty-based regimes. These include incentive-based regulation, civil penalties up to 10% of a company’s turnover, and criminal sanctions. It is important therefore that both Ofwat and the new regulator are and (even more importantly), are seen to be, unbiased in their application of these powers and that potential ‘conflicts of interest’ are managed through appropriate checks and balances. The temptation for a regulator under fire for its own actions to deflect blame through being seen to be tough on others may appear to outsiders to be significant. Ironically, the opposite risk – that of capture is also present. Both arise from the ‘principal-agent’ nature of regulation, where the regulator will never have the full information and knowledge that regulated companies – with different incentives – have, and therefore is always relying on surrogates for full information.
In this context we should note that we have struggled to identify another regulated industry in the GB with a regulator that has such a wide remit without independent checks/key decisions delegated outside the regulator. This breadth of powers places a premium on clarity of role, governance, proportionality, and public confidence in how decisions are taken. It is also the case that while some other economic regulators have broad responsibilities, they have introduced wider internal and external governance to address these concerns. For example, as long ago as 2014, Ofgem set up an Enforcement Decision Panel of external experts to take enforcement decisions, in response to industry and investor concerns about Ofgem acting as legislator, judge (in the broad sense), and jury. Similarly, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) operate through independent panels.
Appendix 3 contains relevant quotes to support this viewpoint from Sir John Cunliffe’s report. Although he does not tackle the issue around Ofwat’s breadth of powers directly, his report does stress that in operating the existing regime, Ofwat and the new regulator need to be careful to avoid what is described as the ‘double jeopardy’ of incentive-based penalties (which are not fully supported by the customer body, Consumer Council for Water), followed by fines/civil penalties1. This is not an argument against strong enforcement, but for enforcement that is clearly anchored in independent judgement and focused on improving outcomes for consumers and the environment.
Regulators also need (as Sir John Cunliffe set out) to enable recovering companies to rebuild capacity and financial resilience. And they must avoid any perception that by imposing penalties they are responding to public criticism – possibly in which their own past decisions could be implicated – rather than operating fairly and proportionately2. The author has argued elsewhere that previously regimes at Ofwat were part of an implicit concord with ministers, companies and consumer bodies to put difficult (and costly) decisions off in the interests of lower bills and good returns to investors – most notably during the long period of over a decade when the cost of capital was systematically falling. For an essential service like water where customers cannot switch provider, it is especially important to avoid outcomes where households face higher costs or delayed environmental improvement as a result of compounded regulatory penalties.
This paper suggests that the legal concept of ‘separation of powers’ which underpins the distinct roles of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, and also appears in fora as diverse as policing and social housing, has merit in how the water regulators should do their job. This was also a conclusion the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) came to (see a summary in Appendix 1). The implications of this are that the regulators must take great care when: defining required outcomes; setting limits on company spend; investigating breaches of regulation/licence condition; and then levying civil penalties (and arguably also seeking criminal penalties, though there is at least a third-party role through the courts).
This approach is supported by the guidance produced by the OECD, summarised in Appendix 1, which stresses the need for a central principle: clearly distinguished roles and responsibilities.
The current position of Ofwat goes beyond simply being what Cunliffe refers to as ‘judge and jury’; in many cases it sets the outcomes and the rules as well. The problem will be made even more pronounced by the inclusion in the new regulator of the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) and parts of the Environment Agency’s (EA) water function. This means that even more of the outcomes, spend, investigation, levying of civil penalties, and prosecution under criminal law will all in effect fall to one body.
The existing regulator, Ofwat, faces nearly all these challenges. The even wider powers for the new regulator present a still stronger challenge to devise appropriate separation of powers within that regulator.
We don’t suggest the new regulator should be broken up before it is even created. But there is a very powerful argument for conscious design solutions to ensure that there is clear separation of responsibilities, governance, and decision making within the new body, and within Ofwat at present. We set out a range of options to achieve this: from strong Chinese walls within both Ofwat and the new regulator – at executive and board level – with those who set outcomes and price controls being strictly separated from those who enforce; to greater external input and oversight, including perhaps from Parliament.
We also set out a range of examples where the case for separation is already accepted.
Defra Environment Agency ofwat Regulation Water Expert viewpoints